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Agno

High-performance, model-agnostic Python framework for building, running, and managing production AI agents at scale.

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التثبيتات404k
⟳ upstream v2.8.3 · updated 3d ago
↗ مستودع المصدر
← More Agentic capabilityAgentic capability leaderboard →How we grade security →Source ↗
✓ Grade A · 100/100 · SafeSecurity assessment
✓No compromise signals22capabilities surfaced5of 20 OWASP controls clear
Broad capability surfaceSuspicious network referencesPotentially unbounded loopSuspicious network references
scanned 2d ago·osv · gitleaks · opengrep · picklescan + heuristics·full breakdown in the Security tab ↓

Agno

Agno (formerly Phidata) is a production-grade Python framework for building multi-modal, multi-provider AI agents. It benchmarks at ~2 µs agent creation time and ~3.75 KiB memory per agent — making it one of the fastest agent runtimes available.

Key Features

  • Model-agnostic — works with OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Groq, Cohere, local Ollama, and 40+ providers
  • Multi-modal — agents natively handle text, image, audio, and video inputs
  • Built-in memory — short and long-term memory via SQLite, PostgreSQL, or Redis
  • Knowledge bases — attach structured knowledge from PDFs, URLs, databases, and vector stores
  • Teams of agents — coordinate multiple agents in parallel or sequential workflows
  • Monitoring — first-class integration with Agno's own monitoring dashboard and OpenTelemetry
  • Minimal boilerplate — define a complete agent with tools in ~10 lines

Quick Start

pip install agno
from agno.agent import Agent
from agno.models.openai import OpenAIChat
from agno.tools.duckduckgo import DuckDuckGoTools

agent = Agent(
    model=OpenAIChat(id="gpt-4o"),
    tools=[DuckDuckGoTools()],
    markdown=True,
)
agent.print_response("What are the top AI papers of 2026?", stream=True)

Install via ai-supply

npx ai-supply add agno-agent-framework

Curated mirror of the open-source Agno (MPL-2.0). Get it from the source.

Rating rank
#1
of 35 in Agentic capability
Install rank
#4
of 35 in Agentic capability
Security score
100/100 · A
safe
Security rank
#1
of 35 in Agentic capability
Installs
404k
cat avg 186k
This listing vs category average
Installs
this
cat avg
Security (of 100)
this
cat avg
Adoption trend
See the Agentic capability leaderboard →
✓ Security: Safe · 100100/100 · grade Ascanned 2d ago
✓ no compromise signals22 risk-surface · 10/20 OWASP controls flagged

Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface, expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.

What this capability can do · med confidence (static)
⚑ filesystem⚑ shell⚑ network⚑ secrets
egress → community.agno.com, pypi.org, astral.sh, www.contributor-covenant.org, docs.github.com, discord.gg, docs.agno.com, agno.com +24

Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10. Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected/risk-surface do not, except a known CVE, which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠LLM01Prompt Injectionhigh
Adversarial instructions embedded in an artifact that hijack a downstream LLM.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/TEST_LOG.md (CWE-77)expected
⚠LLM05Improper Output Handlinghigh
Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — pipe-to-shell install · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.github/workflows/test_on_release.yml (CWE-494)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/02_agents/10_human_in_the_loop/external_tool_execution.py (CWE-78)expected
⚠LLM06Excessive Agencyhigh
Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
•External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.cursorrulesexpected
•External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.github/workflows/test_on_release.ymlexpected
•External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/CONTRIBUTING.mdexpected
•External endpoints declared — 6 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/README.mdexpected
•External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/README.mdexpected
•External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/run.pyexpected
•Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/01_demo/agents/notion_wiki.py (CWE-272)risk surface
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 127.0.0.1 · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/01_demo/run.py (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 13 distinct host(s) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/03_teams/04_structured_input_output/TEST_LOG.mdexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.5, 169.254.169.254 · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/03_production/05_ssrf_allowed_hosts.py (CWE-918)expected
⚠LLM07System Prompt Leakagemedium
Secrets, internal hosts or proprietary logic exposed in shipped prompts.
•Internal host / private infrastructure reference — shipped content references a private IP range or internal-only host · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/03_production/05_ssrf_allowed_hosts.py (CWE-200)risk surface
•Low-confidence secret match — 1 possible: generic-api-key · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/libs/agno/agno/os/auth.py (CWE-798)risk surface
⚠LLM10Unbounded Consumptionmedium
Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
•Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/04_workflows/06_advanced_concepts/background_execution/background_poll.py (CWE-835)risk surface
⚠LLM02Sensitive Information Disclosurelow
Secrets, credentials or PII shipped inside the artifact.
•Low-confidence secret match — 1 possible: generic-api-key · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/libs/agno/agno/os/auth.py (CWE-798)risk surface
⚠LLM03Supply Chainlow
Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
•Dependency manifest — 114 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 90 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/01_demo/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 131 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/08_learning/requirements.txtrisk surface
§LLM09MisinformationGovernance
Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓LLM04Data and Model PoisoningPassed
Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓LLM08Vector and Embedding WeaknessesPassed
PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ML02Data Poisoninghigh
Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/TEST_LOG.md (CWE-77)expected
⚠ML09Output Integrityhigh
Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — pipe-to-shell install · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.github/workflows/test_on_release.yml (CWE-494)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/02_agents/10_human_in_the_loop/external_tool_execution.py (CWE-78)expected
⚠ML06AI Supply Chainlow
Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
•Dependency manifest — 114 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 90 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/01_demo/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 131 pip requirements declared · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/08_learning/requirements.txtrisk surface
§ML01Input Manipulation (Adversarial)Governance
Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ML03Model InversionGovernance
Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ML04Membership InferenceGovernance
Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ML08Model SkewingGovernance
Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ML05Model TheftPassed
Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ML07Transfer Learning AttackPassed
Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ML10Model Poisoning (Weights)Passed
Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (17) · hygiene / uncategorized
•Unrecognized file type — '.cursorrules' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.cursorrulesrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.editorconfig' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.editorconfigrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/.gitignorerisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/CODEOWNERSrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.in' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/00_quickstart/requirements.inrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (1 URLs) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/01_demo/run.pyrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (2 URLs) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/05_agent_os/15_a2a/agent_card.pyrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (4 URLs) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/05_agent_os/15_a2a/client.pyrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (6 URLs) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/05_agent_os/20_remote/05_gateway.pyrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (5 URLs) · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/05_agent_os/24_showcase/README.mdrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.dotx' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/meeting_notes_template.dotxrisk surface
•Archive disguised as another type — content is a zip but extension is .dotx · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/meeting_notes_template.dotxrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.docx' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/project_proposal.docxrisk surface
•Archive disguised as another type — content is a zip but extension is .docx · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/project_proposal.docxrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.tex' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/research_paper.texrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.xlsx' is not on the allowlist · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/sample_products.xlsxrisk surface
•Archive disguised as another type — content is a zip but extension is .xlsx · agno-agi-agno-e24ce01/cookbook/07_knowledge/testing_resources/sample_products.xlsxrisk surface
✔ verified source · pinned agno-agi-agno-e24ce01 · changed since last scan · +egress ai.google.dev
Check against a policy

The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/agno-agent-framework/check). Click a policy:

Consume Agno programmatically. Authenticate with an API key or session — see Authorize an agent.

# Agents: CHECK BEFORE YOU INSTALL (no auth) — score, grade, level, capability manifest
curl https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/agno-agent-framework

# Gate against your org policy (returns { pass, violations })
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/agno-agent-framework/check \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"minGrade":"B","denyPermissions":["shell"],"denyUnknownEgress":true}'

# CLI
npx ai-supply add agno-agent-framework

# REST (install → download)
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/listings/agno-agent-framework/install \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIM_KEY"

# MCP tool
install_listing({ "slug": "agno-agent-framework" })
OpenAPI spec →
vlatest
✓ Security: Safe · 1001mo ago

Curated mirror — latest upstream source. See the repository for tagged releases.

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