! Security: Review · 75 75/100 · grade B scanned 1mo ago
✓ no compromise signals 9 risk-surface · 9/20 OWASP controls flagged
Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface , expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.
Prompt card · med confidence (static)
{homeWorkspace.id} {error.message} {email} {origin} {homeWorkspaceId} {ENDPOINT} {DEPLOYMENT_ID} {functionName} {paramName} {profile.azure_openai_endpoint} {profile.azure_openai_embeddings_id} {chunk} {metadataError.message} {fileError.message} {error.stack} {provider} {profile.user_id} {currentChat.id} {filePath} {selectedWorkspace.id} {ACCEPTED_FILE_TYPES}
Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10 . Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected /risk-surface do not, except a known CVE , which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠ LLM03 Supply Chain critical Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
• Dependency manifest — 2 npm dependencies declared · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/__tests__/playwright-test/package.json risk surface
• Dependency manifest — 97 npm dependencies declared · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/package.json risk surface
• Vulnerable dependencies — 144 known vulnerabilities in: @apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser@11.1.0, @babel/core@7.23.7, @babel/helpers@7.23.8, @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs@7.23.9, @babel/runtime@7.23.8, @langchain/community@0.0.19, @langchain/core@0.1.17, @protobufjs/utf8@1.1.0 (CWE-1395)known CVE · -25 pts
⚠ LLM05 Improper Output Handling high Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
• Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/components/chat/chat-helpers/index.ts (CWE-200)risk surface
• Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/components/messages/message-markdown.tsx (CWE-95)risk surface
⚠ LLM10 Unbounded Consumption medium Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
• Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/lib/consume-stream.ts (CWE-835)risk surface
⚠ LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure low Secrets, credentials or PII shipped inside the artifact.
• Low-confidence secret match — possible: JWT · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/supabase/migrations/20240108234540_setup.sql (CWE-798)risk surface
• Low-confidence secret match — 1 possible: jwt · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/supabase/migrations/20240108234540_setup.sql (CWE-798)risk surface
⚠ LLM06 Excessive Agency low Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
• Broad capability surface — 4 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/package-lock.json (CWE-272)risk surface
• Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/supabase/config.toml (CWE-272)risk surface
⚠ LLM07 System Prompt Leakage low Secrets, internal hosts or proprietary logic exposed in shipped prompts.
• Low-confidence secret match — possible: JWT · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/supabase/migrations/20240108234540_setup.sql (CWE-798)risk surface
• Low-confidence secret match — 1 possible: jwt · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/supabase/migrations/20240108234540_setup.sql (CWE-798)risk surface
§ LLM09 Misinformation Governance Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓ LLM01 Prompt Injection Passed
✓ LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning Passed Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓ LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses Passed PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ ML06 AI Supply Chain critical Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
• Dependency manifest — 2 npm dependencies declared · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/__tests__/playwright-test/package.json risk surface
• Dependency manifest — 97 npm dependencies declared · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/package.json risk surface
• Vulnerable dependencies — 144 known vulnerabilities in: @apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser@11.1.0, @babel/core@7.23.7, @babel/helpers@7.23.8, @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs@7.23.9, @babel/runtime@7.23.8, @langchain/community@0.0.19, @langchain/core@0.1.17, @protobufjs/utf8@1.1.0 (CWE-1395)known CVE · -25 pts
⚠ ML09 Output Integrity high Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
• Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/components/chat/chat-helpers/index.ts (CWE-200)risk surface
• Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/components/messages/message-markdown.tsx (CWE-95)risk surface
⚠ ML05 Model Theft low Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
• No license signal — no SPDX id or license keyword found · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/.env.local.example risk surface
§ ML01 Input Manipulation (Adversarial) Governance Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ ML03 Model Inversion Governance Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ ML04 Membership Inference Governance Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ ML08 Model Skewing Governance Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ ML02 Data Poisoning Passed Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
✓ ML07 Transfer Learning Attack Passed Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ ML10 Model Poisoning (Weights) Passed Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (6) · hygiene / uncategorized • Unrecognized file type — '.example' is not on the allowlist · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/.env.local.example risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/.gitignore risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/.husky/pre-commit risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.nvmrc' is not on the allowlist · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/.nvmrc risk surface
• Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (7 URLs) · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/__tests__/playwright-test/playwright.config.ts risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.cjs' is not on the allowlist · mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6/prettier.config.cjs risk surface
✔ verified source · pinned mckaywrigley-chatbot-ui-81328b6
Check against a policy
The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/chatbot-ui/check). Click a policy:
No shell/exec No unknown egress Grade B or better No secrets access No install hooks Strict (B+ · no shell · no egress)