✓ Security: Safe · 100 100/100 · grade A scanned 34m ago
✓ no compromise signals 11 risk-surface · 6/20 OWASP controls flagged
Only compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score. Dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface , expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to the OWASP control it belongs to below.
What this capability can do · high confidence (static)
Tools (1)
firecrawl_check_crawl_status
⚑ filesystem ⚑ network ⚑ secrets
egress → smithery.ai., smithery.ai, www.knacklabs.ai, mcp.so, www.klavis.ai, mcp.firecrawl.dev, docs.firecrawl.dev, www.firecrawl.dev +15
Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10 . Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected /risk-surface do not.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠ LLM03 Supply Chain high Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
• Dependency manifest — 19 npm dependencies declared · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/package.json risk surface
• Vulnerable dependencies — 23 known vulnerabilities in: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0, ajv@6.12.6, axios@1.15.2, body-parser@2.2.0, esbuild@0.27.7, file-type@21.0.0, follow-redirects@1.15.11, form-data@4.0.5 (CWE-1395)risk surface
⚠ LLM05 Improper Output Handling high Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
• Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts (CWE-200)risk surface
• Path traversal sequences — '../' present in content or name · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts (CWE-22)risk surface
⚠ LLM06 Excessive Agency medium Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
• External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/.github/workflows/publish.yml risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/Dockerfile risk surface
• Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/README.md (CWE-272)risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 17 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/README.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/docker/nginx.conf risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/fastmcp/FastMCP.ts risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts risk surface
⚠ LLM10 Unbounded Consumption medium Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
• Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts (CWE-835)risk surface
§ LLM09 Misinformation Governance Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓ LLM01 Prompt Injection Passed
✓ LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure Passed
✓ LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning Passed Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓ LLM07 System Prompt Leakage Passed
✓ LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses Passed PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ ML06 AI Supply Chain high Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
• Dependency manifest — 19 npm dependencies declared · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/package.json risk surface
• Vulnerable dependencies — 23 known vulnerabilities in: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0, ajv@6.12.6, axios@1.15.2, body-parser@2.2.0, esbuild@0.27.7, file-type@21.0.0, follow-redirects@1.15.11, form-data@4.0.5 (CWE-1395)risk surface
⚠ ML09 Output Integrity high Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
• Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts (CWE-200)risk surface
• Path traversal sequences — '../' present in content or name · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/src/index.ts (CWE-22)risk surface
§ ML01 Input Manipulation (Adversarial) Governance Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ ML03 Model Inversion Governance Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ ML04 Membership Inference Governance Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ ML08 Model Skewing Governance Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ ML02 Data Poisoning Passed Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
✓ ML05 Model Theft Passed Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ ML07 Transfer Learning Attack Passed Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ ML10 Model Poisoning (Weights) Passed Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (5) · hygiene / uncategorized • Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/.gitignore risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.prettierrc' is not on the allowlist · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/.prettierrc risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/Dockerfile risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.service' is not on the allowlist · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/Dockerfile.service risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.conf' is not on the allowlist · firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc/docker/nginx.conf risk surface
✔ verified source · pinned firecrawl-firecrawl-mcp-server-2bab1cc · changed since last scan · +egress smithery.ai., smithery.ai, www.knacklabs.ai, mcp.so, www.klavis.ai, docs.cursor.com, img.shields.io, insiders.vscode.dev, firecrawl.your-domain.com, caw.tech, glama.ai, static.modelcontextprotocol.io, example.com.
Check against a policy
The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/firecrawl-mcp-server/check). Click a policy:
No shell/exec No unknown egress Grade B or better No secrets access No install hooks Strict (B+ · no shell · no egress)