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catalog / Cybersecurity / Agentic Security — LLM Vulnerability Scanner
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Agentic Security — LLM Vulnerability Scanner

Red-teaming kit for agentic LLM workflows: 2000+ adversarial probes, RL-crafted injections, CI-ready.

@ai-supply
Instalações32k
⟳ upstream 0.7.5 · updated 1mo ago
↗ Repositório fonte
← More CybersecurityCybersecurity leaderboard →How we grade security →Source ↗
! Grade B · 88/100 · ReviewSecurity assessment
✓No compromise signals30capabilities surfaced1known CVE6of 20 OWASP controls clear
Broad capability surfaceBroad capability surfacePotentially unbounded loopPossible obfuscation
scanned 18d ago·osv · gitleaks · opengrep · picklescan + heuristics·full breakdown in the Security tab ↓

Agentic Security — LLM Vulnerability Scanner

Agentic Security is an open-source AI red-teaming toolkit that stress-tests LLM APIs and agent workflows against 2000+ adversarial prompts spanning jailbreaks, prompt injections, data exfiltration, OWASP LLM Top-10, and RL-crafted adaptive attacks.

Key features

  • 2,000+ built-in attack payloads (jailbreaks, injections, OWASP LLM01-10)
  • RL-based attack generator that adapts probes based on model responses
  • REST API fuzzing mode — target any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
  • CI integration with GitHub Actions and pass/fail threshold config
  • Dashboard with per-category vulnerability heatmap

Quick start

pip install agentic_security
# Run against any OpenAI-compatible API
agentic_security --target http://localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions --threshold 0.8
npx ai-supply add agentic-security-llm-scanner

Curated mirror of the open-source Agentic Security (Apache-2.0). Get it from the source.

Rating rank
#1
of 19 in Cybersecurity
Install rank
#15
of 19 in Cybersecurity
Security score
88/100 · B
review
Security rank
#6
of 19 in Cybersecurity
Installs
32k
cat avg 85k
This listing vs category average
Installs
this
cat avg
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See the Cybersecurity leaderboard →
! Security: Review · 8888/100 · grade Bscanned 18d ago
✓ no compromise signals31 risk-surface · 9/20 OWASP controls flagged

Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface, expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.

Control card · high confidence (static)
framework: pytestframework: garakcovers: secrets-leakcovers: jailbreakcovers: piicovers: prompt-injectioncovers: robustnesscovers: hallucination
ProbeDatasetvalidate_rule_datastrvalidate_urlvalidate_file_sizevalidate_csv_contenttest_expand_secrets_with_env_vartest_expand_secrets_without_env_vartest_expand_secrets_without_dollar_signvalidateprobescanScanScanResultProbescan_modulescan_routertest_llm_spectest_with_promptvalidate_toolboxtest_llm_with_promptTestModuletest_initialize_with_prompt_groupstest_module_initialization

Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10. Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected/risk-surface do not, except a known CVE, which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠LLM01Prompt Injectionhigh
Adversarial instructions embedded in an artifact that hijack a downstream LLM.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Readme.md (CWE-77)expected
⚠LLM03Supply Chainhigh
Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
•Vulnerable dependencies — 35 known vulnerabilities in: aiohttp@3.13.5, bleach@6.2.0, mistune@3.2.1, pyarrow@21.0.0, python-multipart@0.0.27, soupsieve@2.7, starlette@0.50.0, tornado@6.5.5 (CWE-1395)known CVE · -12 pts
⚠LLM05Improper Output Handlinghigh
Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Dockerfile (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/probe_data/audio_generator.py (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/tailwindcss.js (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution; dynamic code execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/system/test_lib.py (CWE-78)expected
⚠LLM06Excessive Agencyhigh
Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
•External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/.github/dependabot.ymlexpected
•External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Dockerfileexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 0.0.0.0 · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Readme.md (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Readme.mdexpected
•Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/config.py (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/probe_data/data.pyexpected
•External endpoints declared — 10 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/routes/_specs.pyexpected
•External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/routes/static.pyexpected
•Broad capability surface — 5 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/lucide.js (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 6 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/tailwindcss.jsexpected
•External endpoints declared — 8 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/vue.jsexpected
•External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/mkdocs.ymlexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0, 10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1, 169.254.1.1 · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/unit/test_security.py (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 9 distinct host(s) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/unit/test_security.pyexpected
⚠LLM07System Prompt Leakagemedium
Secrets, internal hosts or proprietary logic exposed in shipped prompts.
•Internal host / private infrastructure reference — shipped content references a private IP range or internal-only host · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/unit/test_security.py (CWE-200)expected
⚠LLM10Unbounded Consumptionmedium
Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
•Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/main.js (CWE-835)risk surface
§LLM09MisinformationGovernance
Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePassed
✓LLM04Data and Model PoisoningPassed
Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓LLM08Vector and Embedding WeaknessesPassed
PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ML02Data Poisoninghigh
Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Readme.md (CWE-77)expected
⚠ML06AI Supply Chainhigh
Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
•Vulnerable dependencies — 35 known vulnerabilities in: aiohttp@3.13.5, bleach@6.2.0, mistune@3.2.1, pyarrow@21.0.0, python-multipart@0.0.27, soupsieve@2.7, starlette@0.50.0, tornado@6.5.5 (CWE-1395)known CVE · -12 pts
⚠ML09Output Integrityhigh
Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Dockerfile (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/probe_data/audio_generator.py (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/tailwindcss.js (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution; dynamic code execution · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/system/test_lib.py (CWE-78)expected
§ML01Input Manipulation (Adversarial)Governance
Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ML03Model InversionGovernance
Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ML04Membership InferenceGovernance
Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ML08Model SkewingGovernance
Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ML05Model TheftPassed
Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ML07Transfer Learning AttackPassed
Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ML10Model Poisoning (Weights)Passed
Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (17) · hygiene / uncategorized
•Unrecognized file type — '.dockerignore' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/.dockerignorerisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.flake8' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/.flake8risk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.gitattributes' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/.gitattributesrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/.gitignorerisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Dockerfilerisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (16 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/Readme.mdexpected
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (2 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/probe_data/modules/fine_tuned.pyexpected
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (1 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/probe_data/modules/garak_tool.pyexpected
•Unrecognized file type — '.joblib' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/refusal_classifier/scaler.joblibrisk surface
•Opaque binary content — non-text payload not statically analyzable · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/refusal_classifier/scaler.joblibrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — suspicious TLD (20 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/routes/_specs.pyexpected
•Suspicious network references — suspicious TLD (10 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/base.jsexpected
•Possible obfuscation — very long lines paired with a decode/execute sink · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/static/tailwindcss.js (CWE-506)risk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (4 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/agentic_security/test_spec_assets.pyexpected
•Unrecognized file type — '.http' is not on the allowlist · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/test.httprisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (5 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/test.httpexpected
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (11 URLs) · msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5/tests/unit/test_security.pyexpected
✔ verified source · pinned msoedov-agentic_security-42615e5
Check against a policy

The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/agentic-security-llm-scanner/check). Click a policy:

Consume Agentic Security — LLM Vulnerability Scanner programmatically. Authenticate with an API key or session — see Authorize an agent.

# Agents: CHECK BEFORE YOU INSTALL (no auth) — score, grade, level, capability manifest
curl https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/agentic-security-llm-scanner

# Gate against your org policy (returns { pass, violations })
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/agentic-security-llm-scanner/check \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"minGrade":"B","denyPermissions":["shell"],"denyUnknownEgress":true}'

# CLI
npx ai-supply add agentic-security-llm-scanner

# REST (install → download)
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/listings/agentic-security-llm-scanner/install \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIM_KEY"

# MCP tool
install_listing({ "slug": "agentic-security-llm-scanner" })
OpenAPI spec →
vlatest
! Security: Review · 881mo ago

Curated mirror — latest upstream source. See the repository for tagged releases.

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