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catalog / Agentic capability / Langflow — Visual Agent & Workflow Builder
⌬WorkflowAgentic capabilityFree

Langflow — Visual Agent & Workflow Builder

Low-code visual builder for LLM-powered agents and multi-step AI workflows with 100+ pre-built components.

@ai-supply
Установки576k
⟳ upstream v1.11.0 · updated 5d ago
↗ Исходный репозиторий
← More Agentic capabilityAgentic capability leaderboard →How we grade security →Source ↗
✓ Grade A · 100/100 · SafeSecurity assessment
✓No compromise signals20capabilities surfaced11of 20 OWASP controls clear
Broad capability surfaceSuspicious network referencesSuspicious network referencesSuspicious network references
scanned 2d ago · partial·osv · gitleaks · opengrep · picklescan + heuristics·full breakdown in the Security tab ↓

Langflow

Langflow is a powerful low-code platform for building, testing, and deploying AI-powered agents and multi-step workflows. Its drag-and-drop canvas and Python-based component model let you wire together LLMs, retrieval systems, memory stores, tools, and output parsers without boilerplate.

Key Features

  • Visual canvas for composing agentic pipelines
  • 100+ built-in components: LLMs, vector stores, agents, tools, memory
  • One-click export to Python and REST API
  • Multi-agent support: supervisor, parallel, hierarchical patterns
  • Playground for rapid iteration with live logs
  • Integrates with LangChain, OpenAI, Anthropic, Ollama, and more

Quick Start

pip install langflow
langflow run
# Opens visual canvas at http://127.0.0.1:7860
from langflow.load import run_flow_from_json

result = run_flow_from_json(
    flow="my_agent.json",
    input_value="Summarise the latest AI news",
)
print(result)

Install via ai-supply

npx ai-supply add langflow-visual-agent-builder

Curated mirror of the open-source Langflow (MIT). Get it from the source.

Rating rank
#1
of 35 in Agentic capability
Install rank
#3
of 35 in Agentic capability
Security score
100/100 · A
safe
Security rank
#1
of 35 in Agentic capability
Installs
576k
cat avg 186k
This listing vs category average
Installs
this
cat avg
Security (of 100)
this
cat avg
Adoption trend
See the Agentic capability leaderboard →
✓ Security: Safe · 100100/100 · grade Ascanned 2d ago
✓ no compromise signals20 risk-surface · 4/20 OWASP controls flagged

Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface, expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.

What this capability can do · high confidence (static)
Tools (1)
OpenAI
⚑ filesystem⚑ shell⚑ network⚑ secrets
egress → external-api.com, lucide.dev, www.ibm.com, www.html5accessibility.com, www.deque.com, docs.langflow.org, discord.com, help.github.com +32
830 steps⚑ uses secretshelp.github.comactions/github-script@v7actions/cache@v4github.comwww.conventionalcommits.orgactions/checkout@v6actions/setup-node@v6actions/cache@v5

Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10. Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected/risk-surface do not, except a known CVE, which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠LLM05Improper Output Handlinghigh
Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · langflow/.devcontainer/Dockerfile (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · langflow/docs/docs/API-Reference/javascript-examples/api-build/build-flow-and-stream-events-2.js (CWE-200)expected
⚠LLM06Excessive Agencyhigh
Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
•External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · langflow/.agents/skills/backend-code-review/references/sqlalchemy-rule.mdexpected
•External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · langflow/.agents/skills/ibm-a11y-level1-audit/references/ibm-level1-criteria.mdexpected
•External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · langflow/.devcontainer/README.mdexpected
•Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · langflow/.github/workflows/ci.yml (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · langflow/.github/workflows/ci.ymlexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 127.0.0.1 · langflow/.github/workflows/cross-platform-test.yml (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · langflow/.github/workflows/release-lfx.ymlexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 0.0.0.0 · langflow/DEVELOPMENT.md (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 9 distinct host(s) · langflow/DEVELOPMENT.mdexpected
•Broad capability surface — 4 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · langflow/Makefile (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 16 distinct host(s) · langflow/README.mdexpected
•Egress to an anonymous-paste / tunnel / OOB endpoint — uuid.ngrok.app · langflow/docs/docs/API-Reference/api-reference-api-examples.mdx (CWE-200)expected
⚠LLM10Unbounded Consumptionmedium
Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
•Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · langflow/docs/docs/API-Reference/javascript-examples/workflows-api/example-quickstart-background-poll.js (CWE-835)risk surface
§LLM09MisinformationGovernance
Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓LLM01Prompt InjectionPassed
✓LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePassed
✓LLM03Supply ChainPassed
✓LLM04Data and Model PoisoningPassed
Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓LLM07System Prompt LeakagePassed
✓LLM08Vector and Embedding WeaknessesPassed
PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ML09Output Integrityhigh
Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · langflow/.devcontainer/Dockerfile (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · langflow/docs/docs/API-Reference/javascript-examples/api-build/build-flow-and-stream-events-2.js (CWE-200)expected
§ML01Input Manipulation (Adversarial)Governance
Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ML03Model InversionGovernance
Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ML04Membership InferenceGovernance
Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ML08Model SkewingGovernance
Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ML02Data PoisoningPassed
Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
✓ML05Model TheftPassed
Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ML06AI Supply ChainPassed
✓ML07Transfer Learning AttackPassed
Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ML10Model Poisoning (Weights)Passed
Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (7) · hygiene / uncategorized
•Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · langflow/.devcontainer/Dockerfilerisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (7 URLs) · langflow/.github/workflows/cross-platform-test.ymlrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (19 URLs) · langflow/.github/workflows/db-migration-validation.ymlrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (18 URLs) · langflow/DEVELOPMENT.mdrisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (9 URLs) · langflow/Makefilerisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (27 URLs) · langflow/README.mdrisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.mdx' is not on the allowlist · langflow/docs/docs/API-Reference/api-build.mdxrisk surface
✔ verified source · pinned partial
Check against a policy

The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/langflow-visual-agent-builder/check). Click a policy:

Consume Langflow — Visual Agent & Workflow Builder programmatically. Authenticate with an API key or session — see Authorize an agent.

# Agents: CHECK BEFORE YOU INSTALL (no auth) — score, grade, level, capability manifest
curl https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/langflow-visual-agent-builder

# Gate against your org policy (returns { pass, violations })
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/langflow-visual-agent-builder/check \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"minGrade":"B","denyPermissions":["shell"],"denyUnknownEgress":true}'

# CLI
npx ai-supply add langflow-visual-agent-builder

# REST (install → download)
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/listings/langflow-visual-agent-builder/install \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIM_KEY"

# MCP tool
install_listing({ "slug": "langflow-visual-agent-builder" })
OpenAPI spec →
vlatest
✓ Security: Safe · 1001mo ago

Curated mirror — latest upstream source. See the repository for tagged releases.

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