✓ Security: Safe · 100 100/100 · grade A scanned 39m ago
✓ no compromise signals 7 risk-surface · 7/20 OWASP controls flagged
Only compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score. Dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface , expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to the OWASP control it belongs to below.
What this capability can do · high confidence (static)
Tools (12)
search_contacts list_messages list_chats get_chat get_direct_chat_by_contact get_contact_chats get_last_interaction get_message_context send_message send_file send_audio_message download_media
⚑ filesystem ⚑ shell ⚑ network
egress → docs.google.com, simonwillison.net, astral.sh, www.msys2.org, code.visualstudio.com, modelcontextprotocol.io, mmg.whatsapp.net
Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10 . Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected /risk-surface do not.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠ LLM03 Supply Chain critical Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
• Vulnerable dependencies — 104 known vulnerabilities in: filippo.io/edwards25519@1.1.0, golang.org/x/crypto@0.36.0, golang.org/x/net@0.37.0, golang.org/x/sys@0.31.0, stdlib@1.24.1, h11@0.14.0, idna@3.10, mcp@1.6.0 (CWE-1395)risk surface
⚠ LLM01 Prompt Injection high Adversarial instructions embedded in an artifact that hijack a downstream LLM.
• Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/README.md (CWE-77)risk surface
⚠ LLM05 Improper Output Handling high Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
• Suspicious code patterns — pipe-to-shell install · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/README.md (CWE-494)risk surface
• Path traversal sequences — '../' present in content or name · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-bridge/main.go (CWE-22)risk surface
• Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-mcp-server/audio.py (CWE-78)risk surface
⚠ LLM06 Excessive Agency low Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
• External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/README.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-bridge/main.go risk surface
§ LLM09 Misinformation Governance Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
◷ LLM10 Unbounded Consumption Runtime-enforced Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
✓ LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure Passed
✓ LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning Passed Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓ LLM07 System Prompt Leakage Passed
✓ LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses Passed PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ ML06 AI Supply Chain critical Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
• Vulnerable dependencies — 104 known vulnerabilities in: filippo.io/edwards25519@1.1.0, golang.org/x/crypto@0.36.0, golang.org/x/net@0.37.0, golang.org/x/sys@0.31.0, stdlib@1.24.1, h11@0.14.0, idna@3.10, mcp@1.6.0 (CWE-1395)risk surface
⚠ ML02 Data Poisoning high Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
• Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/README.md (CWE-77)risk surface
⚠ ML09 Output Integrity high Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
• Suspicious code patterns — pipe-to-shell install · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/README.md (CWE-494)risk surface
• Path traversal sequences — '../' present in content or name · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-bridge/main.go (CWE-22)risk surface
• Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-mcp-server/audio.py (CWE-78)risk surface
§ ML01 Input Manipulation (Adversarial) Governance Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ ML03 Model Inversion Governance Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ ML04 Membership Inference Governance Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ ML08 Model Skewing Governance Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ ML05 Model Theft Passed Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ ML07 Transfer Learning Attack Passed Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ ML10 Model Poisoning (Weights) Passed Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (5) · hygiene / uncategorized • Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/.gitignore risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/LICENSE risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.mod' is not on the allowlist · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-bridge/go.mod risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.sum' is not on the allowlist · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-bridge/go.sum risk surface
• Unrecognized file type — '.python-version' is not on the allowlist · lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d/whatsapp-mcp-server/.python-version risk surface
✔ verified source · pinned lharries-whatsapp-mcp-7d6a06d · changed since last scan · +egress docs.google.com, simonwillison.net, astral.sh, www.msys2.org, code.visualstudio.com, modelcontextprotocol.io
Check against a policy
The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/whatsapp-mcp-server/check). Click a policy:
No shell/exec No unknown egress Grade B or better No secrets access No install hooks Strict (B+ · no shell · no egress)