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Hugging Face Accelerate

Run PyTorch training scripts on any hardware — single GPU, multi-GPU, TPU — with minimal code changes.

@ai-supply
Installs404k
⟳ upstream v1.14.0 · updated 1mo ago
↗ Source repository
← More Language & NLPLanguage & NLP leaderboard →How we grade security →Source ↗
✓ Grade A · 100/100 · SafeSecurity assessment
✓No compromise signals19capabilities surfaced8of 20 OWASP controls clear
External endpoints declaredExternal endpoints declaredExternal endpoints declaredExternal endpoints declared
scanned 17d ago·osv · gitleaks · opengrep · picklescan + heuristics·full breakdown in the Security tab ↓

Hugging Face Accelerate

Accelerate is a library that enables the same PyTorch training code to run seamlessly on any distributed configuration: single CPU, single GPU, multi-GPU (DDP/FSDP/DeepSpeed), TPU, or mixed precision — with almost no code changes required. It abstracts away all the boilerplate of distributed training.

Key Features

  • Hardware agnostic: single line change to go from single GPU to 8-GPU DDP or TPU
  • FSDP and DeepSpeed integration: scale to billions of parameters with memory-efficient sharding
  • Mixed precision: fp16, bf16, fp8 training with gradient scaling
  • Gradient accumulation and checkpointing built-in
  • Big Model Inference: load models larger than GPU memory via device mapping
  • Fully compatible with vanilla PyTorch — no new abstractions to learn

Quick Start

from accelerate import Accelerator

accelerator = Accelerator()
model, optimizer, train_loader = accelerator.prepare(model, optimizer, train_loader)

for batch in train_loader:
    outputs = model(**batch)
    loss = outputs.loss
    accelerator.backward(loss)
    optimizer.step()
    optimizer.zero_grad()
# Launch multi-GPU training
accelerate launch --num_processes 4 train.py

Install via ai-supply

npx ai-supply add huggingface-accelerate-training

Curated mirror of the open-source Hugging Face Accelerate (Apache-2.0). Get it from the source.

Rating rank
#1
of 30 in Language & NLP
Install rank
#5
of 30 in Language & NLP
Security score
100/100 · A
safe
Security rank
#1
of 30 in Language & NLP
Installs
404k
cat avg 145k
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Installs
this
cat avg
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this
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See the Language & NLP leaderboard →
✓ Security: Safe · 100100/100 · grade Ascanned 17d ago
✓ no compromise signals19 risk-surface · 7/20 OWASP controls flagged

Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface, expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.

What this capability can do · med confidence (static)
⚑ filesystem⚑ shell⚑ network⚑ secrets
egress → discuss.huggingface.co, help.github.com, www.contributor-covenant.org, www.apache.org, git-scm.com, docs.github.com, code.visualstudio.com, docs.microsoft.com +32
30 scripts

Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10. Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected/risk-surface do not, except a known CVE, which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠LLM05Improper Output Handlinghigh
Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/benchmarks/fp8/ms_amp/fp8_utils.py (CWE-95)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docker/accelerate-gpu-deepspeed/Dockerfile (CWE-78)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/commands/env.py (CWE-78)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — pickle deserialization · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/test_utils/scripts/test_distributed_data_loop.py (CWE-502)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/utils/dataclasses.py (CWE-200)risk surface
⚠LLM06Excessive Agencymedium
Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
•External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug-report.ymlrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/.github/workflows/gaudi3_scheduled.ymlrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 8 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/CONTRIBUTING.mdrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 17 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/README.mdrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/README.mdrisk surface
•Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/basic_tutorials/launch.md (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 6 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/basic_tutorials/troubleshooting.mdrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/concept_guides/context_parallelism.mdrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/usage_guides/distributed_inference.mdrisk surface
•External endpoints declared — 12 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/usage_guides/training_zoo.mdrisk surface
•Broad capability surface — 4 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/commands/launch.py (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/utils/dataclasses.pyrisk surface
⚠LLM07System Prompt Leakagemedium
Secrets, internal hosts or proprietary logic exposed in shipped prompts.
•Internal host / private infrastructure reference — shipped content references a private IP range or internal-only host · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docs/source/basic_tutorials/notebook.md (CWE-200)risk surface
⚠LLM10Unbounded Consumptionmedium
Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
•Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/benchmarks/big_model_inference/measures_util.py (CWE-835)risk surface
⚠LLM03Supply Chainlow
Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
•Dependency manifest — 2 pip requirements declared · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/examples/inference/pippy/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 5 pip requirements declared · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/examples/requirements.txtrisk surface
§LLM09MisinformationGovernance
Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓LLM01Prompt InjectionPassed
✓LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePassed
✓LLM04Data and Model PoisoningPassed
Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓LLM08Vector and Embedding WeaknessesPassed
PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ML09Output Integrityhigh
Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/benchmarks/fp8/ms_amp/fp8_utils.py (CWE-95)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/docker/accelerate-gpu-deepspeed/Dockerfile (CWE-78)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — OS command execution · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/commands/env.py (CWE-78)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — pickle deserialization · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/test_utils/scripts/test_distributed_data_loop.py (CWE-502)risk surface
•Suspicious code patterns — environment/secret exfiltration · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/src/accelerate/utils/dataclasses.py (CWE-200)risk surface
⚠ML06AI Supply Chainlow
Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
•Dependency manifest — 2 pip requirements declared · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/examples/inference/pippy/requirements.txtrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 5 pip requirements declared · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/examples/requirements.txtrisk surface
§ML01Input Manipulation (Adversarial)Governance
Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ML03Model InversionGovernance
Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ML04Membership InferenceGovernance
Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ML08Model SkewingGovernance
Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ML02Data PoisoningPassed
Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
✓ML05Model TheftPassed
Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ML07Transfer Learning AttackPassed
Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ML10Model Poisoning (Weights)Passed
Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (2) · hygiene / uncategorized
•Unrecognized file type — '.gitignore' is not on the allowlist · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/.gitignorerisk surface
•Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · huggingface-accelerate-665444c/LICENSErisk surface
✔ verified source · pinned huggingface-accelerate-665444c
Check against a policy

The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/huggingface-accelerate-training/check). Click a policy:

Consume Hugging Face Accelerate programmatically. Authenticate with an API key or session — see Authorize an agent.

# Agents: CHECK BEFORE YOU INSTALL (no auth) — score, grade, level, capability manifest
curl https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/huggingface-accelerate-training

# Gate against your org policy (returns { pass, violations })
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/huggingface-accelerate-training/check \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"minGrade":"B","denyPermissions":["shell"],"denyUnknownEgress":true}'

# CLI
npx ai-supply add huggingface-accelerate-training

# REST (install → download)
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/listings/huggingface-accelerate-training/install \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIM_KEY"

# MCP tool
install_listing({ "slug": "huggingface-accelerate-training" })
OpenAPI spec →
vlatest
✓ Security: Safe · 1001mo ago

Curated mirror — latest upstream source. See the repository for tagged releases.

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