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△EvalDevOps & InfraFree

promptfoo

LLM eval + red-teaming framework — test prompts and models against custom assertions, compare providers, and catch regressions in CI.

@ai-supply
Installs62k
⟳ upstream 0.121.19 · updated 12d ago
↗ Source repository
← More DevOps & InfraDevOps & Infra leaderboard →How we grade security →Source ↗
✓ Grade A · 100/100 · SafeSecurity assessment
✓No compromise signals21capabilities surfaced4of 20 OWASP controls clear
Broad capability surfaceBroad capability surfacePotentially unbounded loopBroad capability surface
scanned 7d ago · partial·osv · gitleaks · opengrep · picklescan + heuristics·full breakdown in the Security tab ↓

promptfoo

promptfoo is a developer-first LLM evaluation and red-teaming framework. Write test cases with assertions, run them against any model or prompt variant, compare results side-by-side, and integrate automated evals into your CI pipeline — before bad outputs reach production.

Key features

  • Declarative test cases — define expected outputs with string matchers, regex, JSON schema, semantic similarity, or LLM-as-judge
  • Multi-provider comparison — benchmark the same prompts across OpenAI, Anthropic, Groq, Mistral, and local models simultaneously
  • Red-teaming — automated adversarial probing for jailbreaks, prompt injection, PII leakage, and harmful content
  • CI integration — promptfoo eval exits non-zero on failures; ships a GitHub Actions example
  • Web UI — browser-based results viewer and diff tool
  • Caching — reuse LLM responses to speed up iterative prompt development

Quick start

npx ai-supply add promptfoo-llm-eval

# Or install directly
npm install -g promptfoo

# Initialize a config
promptfoo init
# promptfooconfig.yaml
prompts:
  - "Summarize the following: {{text}}"

providers:
  - openai:gpt-4o
  - anthropic:claude-opus-4-5

tests:
  - vars:
      text: "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog."
    assert:
      - type: contains
        value: fox
      - type: llm-rubric
        value: "The summary is concise and accurate."
promptfoo eval
promptfoo view

Curated mirror of the open-source promptfoo project (MIT). Install upstream from the repository.

Rating rank
#1
of 23 in DevOps & Infra
Install rank
#16
of 23 in DevOps & Infra
Security score
100/100 · A
safe
Security rank
#1
of 23 in DevOps & Infra
Installs
62k
cat avg 212k
This listing vs category average
Installs
this
cat avg
Security (of 100)
this
cat avg
Adoption trend
See the DevOps & Infra leaderboard →
✓ Security: Safe · 100100/100 · grade Ascanned 7d ago
✓ no compromise signals21 risk-surface · 11/20 OWASP controls flagged

Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface, expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.

Control card · high confidence (static)
framework: promptfooframework: pytestframework: garakframework: guardrails-aicovers: jailbreakcovers: robustnesscovers: secrets-leakcovers: hallucinationcovers: prompt-injectioncovers: biascovers: pii
json_object-objectjavascriptllm-rubriclatencycoststringtest_functionvalidatedSeverityvalidatedConfigscanResponsescanEnvprojectpatchcontainscontains-jsonregex

Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10. Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected/risk-surface do not, except a known CVE, which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠LLM01Prompt Injectionhigh
Adversarial instructions embedded in an artifact that hijack a downstream LLM.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · promptfoo/.agents/skills/redteam-plugin-development/SKILL.md (CWE-77)expected
⚠LLM02Sensitive Information Disclosurehigh
Secrets, credentials or PII shipped inside the artifact.
•Email addresses present — contains email-like strings · promptfoo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.mdexpected
•Phone number present — contains phone number-like pattern (E.164 or formatted) · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/0000_snapshot.json (CWE-359)expected
•Credit-card-like number — a number passes the Luhn checksum · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/_journal.json (CWE-359)expected
⚠LLM05Improper Output Handlinghigh
Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · promptfoo/.github/workflows/docker.yml (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution; environment/secret exfiltration · promptfoo/code-scan-action/src/main.ts (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · promptfoo/examples/azure-mai/README.md (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — child_process exec · promptfoo/examples/claude-agent-sdk/advanced/hooks.js (CWE-78)expected
⚠LLM06Excessive Agencyhigh
Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
•External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/.claude-plugin/marketplace.jsonexpected
•Broad capability surface — 3 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · promptfoo/.claude/skills/promptfoo-evals/SKILL.md (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/.github/assets/promptfooconfig.yamlexpected
•External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/.github/workflows/main.ymlexpected
•External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.mdexpected
•Egress to a private/loopback host — 127.0.0.1 · promptfoo/Dockerfile (CWE-918)expected
•External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/README.mdexpected
•Broad capability surface — 5 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · promptfoo/SECURITY.md (CWE-272)risk surface
•Broad capability surface — 4 high-impact capability categories referenced — verify least-privilege · promptfoo/code-scan-action/src/main.ts (CWE-272)risk surface
•External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · promptfoo/examples/amazon-bedrock/models/README.mdexpected
⚠LLM08Vector and Embedding Weaknesseshigh
PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
•Email addresses present — contains email-like strings · promptfoo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.mdexpected
•Phone number present — contains phone number-like pattern (E.164 or formatted) · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/0000_snapshot.json (CWE-359)expected
•Credit-card-like number — a number passes the Luhn checksum · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/_journal.json (CWE-359)expected
⚠LLM07System Prompt Leakagemedium
Secrets, internal hosts or proprietary logic exposed in shipped prompts.
•Internal host / private infrastructure reference — shipped content references a private IP range or internal-only host · promptfoo/code-scan-action/.github/workflows/test-scan.yml (CWE-200)expected
⚠LLM10Unbounded Consumptionmedium
Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
•Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · promptfoo/code-scan-action/src/main.ts (CWE-835)risk surface
⚠LLM03Supply Chainlow
Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
•Dependency manifest — 8 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/code-scan-action/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 1 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/claude-agent-sdk/working-dir/sample-project/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 4 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/config-node-package-typescript/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 3 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/config-stateful-session-management/package.jsonrisk surface
§LLM09MisinformationGovernance
Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓LLM04Data and Model PoisoningPassed
Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ML02Data Poisoninghigh
Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
•Prompt-injection phrasing — instruction-subversion language detected · promptfoo/.agents/skills/redteam-plugin-development/SKILL.md (CWE-77)expected
•Email addresses present — contains email-like strings · promptfoo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.mdexpected
•Phone number present — contains phone number-like pattern (E.164 or formatted) · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/0000_snapshot.json (CWE-359)expected
•Credit-card-like number — a number passes the Luhn checksum · promptfoo/drizzle/meta/_journal.json (CWE-359)expected
⚠ML09Output Integrityhigh
Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
•Suspicious code patterns — destructive rm -rf / · promptfoo/.github/workflows/docker.yml (CWE-78)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution; environment/secret exfiltration · promptfoo/code-scan-action/src/main.ts (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · promptfoo/examples/azure-mai/README.md (CWE-95)expected
•Suspicious code patterns — child_process exec · promptfoo/examples/claude-agent-sdk/advanced/hooks.js (CWE-78)expected
⚠ML06AI Supply Chainlow
Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
•Dependency manifest — 8 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/code-scan-action/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 1 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/claude-agent-sdk/working-dir/sample-project/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 4 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/config-node-package-typescript/package.jsonrisk surface
•Dependency manifest — 3 npm dependencies declared · promptfoo/examples/config-stateful-session-management/package.jsonrisk surface
§ML01Input Manipulation (Adversarial)Governance
Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ML03Model InversionGovernance
Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ML04Membership InferenceGovernance
Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ML08Model SkewingGovernance
Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ML05Model TheftPassed
Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ML07Transfer Learning AttackPassed
Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ML10Model Poisoning (Weights)Passed
Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (3) · hygiene / uncategorized
•Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · promptfoo/Dockerfilerisk surface
•Suspicious network references — raw IP URL (2 URLs) · promptfoo/Dockerfileexpected
•Unrecognized file type — '.mjs' is not on the allowlist · promptfoo/examples/config-custom-prompt-function/prompt_esm.mjsrisk surface
✔ verified source · pinned partial
Check against a policy

The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/promptfoo-llm-eval/check). Click a policy:

Consume promptfoo programmatically. Authenticate with an API key or session — see Authorize an agent.

# Agents: CHECK BEFORE YOU INSTALL (no auth) — score, grade, level, capability manifest
curl https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/promptfoo-llm-eval

# Gate against your org policy (returns { pass, violations })
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/trust/promptfoo-llm-eval/check \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"minGrade":"B","denyPermissions":["shell"],"denyUnknownEgress":true}'

# CLI
npx ai-supply add promptfoo-llm-eval

# REST (install → download)
curl -X POST https://ai-supply.store/api/v1/listings/promptfoo-llm-eval/install \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIM_KEY"

# MCP tool
install_listing({ "slug": "promptfoo-llm-eval" })
OpenAPI spec →
vlatest
✓ Security: Safe · 1001mo ago

Curated mirror — latest upstream source. See the repository for tagged releases.

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