✓ Security: Safe · 100 100/100 · grade A scanned 16d ago
✓ no compromise signals 12 risk-surface · 6/20 OWASP controls flagged
Compromise signals — malicious or tampered code (leaked secrets, backdoors, a dropped executable) — reduce the score, and known dependency CVEs carry a bounded penalty (they warrant review but never QUARANTINE — update the dependency to clear). Other dangerous-by-capability traits are risk surface , expected for some capabilities. Every finding is mapped to its OWASP control below.
What this capability can do · med confidence (static)
⚑ filesystem ⚑ shell ⚑ secrets
egress → help.github.com, pypi.org, robosuite.ai, ariseinitiative.slack.com, pre-commit.com, docs.github.com, google.github.io, arxiv.org +32
23 steps ⚑ uses secrets help.github.com github.com actions/checkout@v3 actions/setup-python@v3 pre-commit/action@v3.0.0 actions/setup-python@v4 peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3 actions/checkout@v4
Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10 . Expand any flagged control for the exact findings — compromise reduces the score; expected /risk-surface do not, except a known CVE , which carries a small bounded penalty (high/critical → Review).
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
⚠ LLM03 Supply Chain medium Vulnerable/compromised dependencies, models or archives in the artifact.
• Dependency manifest — 1 pip requirements declared · robosuite/requirements.txt risk surface
• Non-registry dependency source — 1 requirement(s) from git/URL/editable · robosuite/requirements.txt (CWE-829)risk surface
⚠ LLM05 Improper Output Handling medium Code that pipes model/user output into shell, eval, SQL or paths unsafely.
• Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · robosuite/robosuite/controllers/composite/composite_controller.py (CWE-95)expected
• Suspicious code patterns — pickle deserialization · robosuite/robosuite/utils/ik_utils.py (CWE-502)expected
⚠ LLM06 Excessive Agency medium Over-broad tool/permission surface or unrestricted egress.
• External endpoints declared — 1 distinct host(s) · robosuite/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug-report.yml risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 6 distinct host(s) · robosuite/CONTRIBUTING.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 9 distinct host(s) · robosuite/README.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 15 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/acknowledgement.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 4 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/algorithms/benchmarking.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 7 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/demos.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 2 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/modules/devices.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 3 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/modules/overview.md risk surface
• External endpoints declared — 5 distinct host(s) · robosuite/docs/modules/renderers.md risk surface
⚠ LLM10 Unbounded Consumption medium Unbounded loops/recursion causing DoS or runaway cost.
Enforced at runtime by the gateway (rate limits + spend caps + size caps); static check flags unbounded loops.
• Potentially unbounded loop — an infinite loop (while True / while(1) / for(;;)) may cause runaway consumption · robosuite/robosuite/demos/demo_device_control.py (CWE-835)risk surface
§ LLM09 Misinformation Governance Artifacts designed to produce false/deceptive output.
Detectable only by runtime behavioral evaluation; addressed via responsible-use attestation.
✓ LLM01 Prompt Injection Passed
✓ LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure Passed
✓ LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning Passed Backdoors/poisoning in training data or serialized models.
Behavioral poisoning needs model execution; static check covers unsafe serialization + dataset skew only.
✓ LLM07 System Prompt Leakage Passed
✓ LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses Passed PII or plaintext source leakage in embedding/vector exports.
Embedding inversion/poisoning is largely runtime; static check covers PII in vector exports.
OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
⚠ ML06 AI Supply Chain medium Compromised PyPI/npm packages, typosquats, unsafe serialized models.
• Dependency manifest — 1 pip requirements declared · robosuite/requirements.txt risk surface
• Non-registry dependency source — 1 requirement(s) from git/URL/editable · robosuite/requirements.txt (CWE-829)risk surface
⚠ ML09 Output Integrity medium Middleware tampering with model outputs in transit.
Gateway enforces TLS + response integrity; static check flags output-rewriting code.
• Suspicious code patterns — dynamic code execution · robosuite/robosuite/controllers/composite/composite_controller.py (CWE-95)expected
• Suspicious code patterns — pickle deserialization · robosuite/robosuite/utils/ik_utils.py (CWE-502)expected
§ ML01 Input Manipulation (Adversarial) Governance Models vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Requires runtime robustness evaluation; addressed via publisher robustness attestation.
§ ML03 Model Inversion Governance Training data reconstructable from a model's outputs.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via model-card data-provenance + DP attestation.
§ ML04 Membership Inference Governance Determining whether a record was in the training set.
Runtime/evaluation property; addressed via overfitting disclosure + DP attestation.
§ ML08 Model Skewing Governance Models trained on skewed data producing biased output.
Requires fairness evaluation; addressed via model-card bias/limitations disclosure.
✓ ML02 Data Poisoning Passed Poisoned training datasets with triggers or anomalous distributions.
Static check covers trigger phrasing, PII and label skew; full poisoning detection is runtime.
✓ ML05 Model Theft Passed Unlicensed re-distribution / license-incompatible derivatives.
Static check verifies license declaration; extraction throttling is runtime.
✓ ML07 Transfer Learning Attack Passed Backdoored base models / LoRA adapters propagating to derivatives.
Backdoor detection needs behavioral probing; static check covers unsafe serialization + provenance.
✓ ML10 Model Poisoning (Weights) Passed Tampered model weight files; integrity must be verifiable.
Static check enforces safe formats + records a content hash for downstream verification.
Other findings (1) · hygiene / uncategorized • Unrecognized file type — '.?' is not on the allowlist · robosuite/docs/Makefile risk surface
✔ verified source · pinned partial
Check against a policy
The same gate an agent runs before installing (POST /api/v1/trust/robosuite-robot-simulation/check). Click a policy:
No shell/exec No unknown egress Grade B or better No secrets access No install hooks Strict (B+ · no shell · no egress)